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I. INTRODUCION
As the trade barriers fall like a waterline, the low tide reveals
rocks and shoals -which are the private restraints and uncaught
government restraints. Moreover, the freer trade engenders newo,
defensive restraints. Entrenched businesses, and nations then-
selves, face perverse incentives to rebuild border barriers for pri-
vate and nationalistic ends, protecting the newly vulnerable na-
tional advantage.... Thus, trade liberalization sets the stage for
private and hybrid abuses, suggesting the need for a voice for free
trade and competition in the world.,
When left to their own devices, national competition policy-
makers will favor domestic producer interests over foreign pro-
ducer and consumer interests. The failure, whether real or per-
ceived, of national policy-makers to take action to eliminate anti-
competitive private restraints is a growing source of international
tension. For instance, in the so-called "Fuji-Kodak" dispute, the
United States alleged that Japanese distributors of photographic
film excluded foreign producers from their distribution systems,
and that Japanese authorities failed to enforce their antitrust
laws-and even encouraged the distributors to exclude foreign
producers.2 In addition, many national laws explicitly exempt
* Associate in international trade practice, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering,
Washington, DC. Thanks are due to Pierre Sauv6, Ann-Marie Slaughter and my
wife, Lindy.
I Eleanor M. Fox, Toward World Antitrust and Market Access, 91 A.L J. If'L L
1,3-4 (1997).
2 WTO Panel Report, Japan - Measures Affecting Consutner Photagraphic Film
and Paper, WT/DS44/R (Mar. 31,1998) [hereinafter Japan - PhotographicFfilm].
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cartels that operate exclusively in export markets from the general
provisions of antitrust law. In the European market, non-European
suppliers of avionics and other components have alleged that Air-
bus Industrie uses standards that arbitrarily discriminate against
foreign suppliers.3
Drawing from observations of the economics and law of com-
petition policy, as well as from the basic principles of international
relations ("IR") theory, this paper defines the most pressing prob-
lems of competition policies in the global economy, analyzes vari-
ous proposals for dealing with competition policy at the interna-
tional level, and provides an alternative proposal. Emphasizing
the complexities and cultural nuances of competition policies, Sec-
tion 2 sketches the basic economic, legal, and policy principles that
surround competitive markets. Section 3 defines the "most press-
ing problems" of competition policies in the global economy. Sec-
tion 4 introduces the basic principles of the three most prominent
IR theories and uses these theories to analyze the origins of the
problems identified in Section 3. Section 5 describes four interna-
tional competition policy proposals and evaluates these proposals
based on the economic and legal observations and on the basic
principles of IR theory. Based on the lessons learned from Section
5, Section 6 provides an alternative proposal, exclusively address-
ing market access limitations that result from private vertical re-
straints. In essence, Members of the World Trade Organization
would adopt a "Distribution Services Reference Paper on Regula-
tory Principles" as a means to enhance the effectiveness of the Arti-
cle IX consultation procedure in the General Agreement on Trade
in Services ("GATS"). Pursuant to this Reference Paper, Members
would agree to submit such disputes to an ad hoc panel of compe-
tition policy experts for a non-binding determination of whether an
action (or inaction) of the national competition authorities harms
domestic consumers and limits market access for foreign produc-
ers. This determination would provide both the international
community of states and domestic interest groups with much-
needed information about the effects of a nation's competition
policies. Section 7 concludes.
3 INT'L COMPETITION POL'Y ADVISORY COMM. TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND
ASSISTANT ATT'Y GEN'L FOR ANTITRUsT, FINAL REPORT 217 (2000) [hereinafter
ICPAC REPORT].
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2. THE ECONOMICS, LAW AND POLICY OF COMPETITIVE MARES
Before reaching international issues, this section summarizes
the basic economic, policy, and legal principles of competitive
markets within national boundaries. The one consistent theme of
this section is that the economics and legal principles guiding
competition policy are especially complex-even in the relatively
simple domestic setting. As discussed below, this complexity pro-
vides a formidable challenge to proposals that seek to lessen the
tension between trade and competition policies.
2.1. The Economics of Free Trade and Competitive Markets
Competition is the linchpin of the free market system. A mar-
ket is considered competitive if individual firms in that market
have little or no power to influence the price or other terms on
which products are sold.4 By ensuring that resources are allocated
efficiently and by spurring innovation, competitive markets ulti-
mately maximize consumer welfare.5
Despite the many "efficiency gains" of competition, more com-
petition, or at least more competitors, is not necessarily more effi-
cient In many instances cooperation, the antithesis of competition,
produces even greater efficiency gains. For instance, joint ventures
for research and development between competitors may lead to a
greater degree of innovation; a merger of two rivals may result in
significant economies of scale.
This tension between competition and cooperation is particu-
larly relevant to so-called "vertical restraints," an area of competi-
tion policy that gives rise to many international trade disputes, in-
cluding Fuji-Kodak.6 Vertical restraints frequently involve the
relationship between manufacturers and wholesale and retail dis-
tributors. They typically relate to the prices at which distributors
sell, the geographic territories or classes of customers to which they
sell, or the degree of exclusivity the manufacturer or the distributor
can count on from the other.
7
4 RicHARD G. LIPSEY Er AL, MICROECONOMICS 212 (8th ed. 1988).
5 F. M. SCHERER, COMPErrrION POUCIF.s FOR AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY 3
(1994).
6 See ICPAC REPORT, supra note 3, at 211-20.
7 MILTON HANDLER ET AL, TRADE REGULATION: CASE AND MATERIALS 572 (3d
ed. 1990).
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While the negative anti-competitive effects of these restraints
can be considerable, the positive cooperative effects also deserve
consideration. To ensure that its distributors have a strong incen-
tive to promote its products, a manufacturer may prohibit its dis-
tributors from selling the products of competitors.S Without such a
prohibition, a distributor may lack any incentive to pay for costly
promotion campaigns, because other distributors can free ride on
the promotion campaigns and then sell the product for less.9 As a
result, economists generally accept vertical restraints if rival firms
have equivalent opportunities to cooperate and integrate. But if,
for example, a new entrant must build an expensive new distribu-
tion network, the efficiency gains from eliminating the restraints
are likely to outweigh the gains from existing networks of manu-
facturers and distributors.10
The crucial point is that the economics of competition policy,
especially vertical restraints, do not permit easy answers. "The
reasons for and consequences of such practices are extremely com-
plex, and economists' evaluations of their desirability diverge by
much more than the quantum customary in a profession not
known for unanimity of viewpoints."" As explained below, this
complexity, the result of the opposing efficiency gains from coop-
eration and competition, gives rise to international disagreements
and makes dispute resolution difficult.
2.2. The Law and Policy of Competitive Markets
Three facts about domestic competition laws add to the com-
plexity of the international problem. First, many national compe-
tition laws reflect the fact that market concentration, and especially
vertical restraints, are not necessarily inefficient as explained
above. As a consequence, courts and competition authorities reject
bright-line rules in favor of a "case-by-case" or "rule of reason"
approach. For example, courts in the United States recognize the
efficiency gains that often result from vertical restraints such as ex-
clusive dealing and exclusive purchasing contracts. "[These con-
tracts] are illegal under a rule of reason if they can be proved to in-
s See EDWARD M. GRAHAM & J. DAvID RICHARDSON, GLOBAL CoMPETrrION
POLICY 23 (1997).
9 See HANDLER ET AL., supra note 7, at 575.
10 See GRAHAM & RICHARDSON, supra note 8, at 25.
11 SCHERER, supra note 5, at 70.
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crease the coordinative behavior of competitors in an oligopoly, or
if they raise barriers to entry and thus enhance unilateral price-
raising power."12 While the "rule of reason" is necessary to ensure
that legal decisions are consistent with economic principles, it also
makes clear that a detailed analysis of each individual case is nec-
essary before the text of competition laws may be applied. It also
suggests that the drafters of international agreements on competi-
tion policy should recognize that general and flexible principles
should be favored over bright-line rules.
Second, although economic theory largely drives competition
law and policy, culturally nuanced considerations of fairness also
play an important role in many countries. Unlike the fairly objec-
tive quality of efficiency, commentators and policymakers within,
and especially across, countries will differ in their definition and
pursuit of fairness in competition policy. "In the United States,
[fairness] often means equality of opportunity or (in our context)
free entry into a business endeavor. In other countries, it some-
times means that favored activity or loyalty should be rewarded,
or that equity of process or outcome (market division according to
historic shares) is valued." 3
The interests in economic efficiency and social fairness can di-
verge in competition policy. For example, market concentration
may achieve economies of scale and lower consumer prices, but
may force small- and medium-sized enterprises out of the market,
some would say "unfairly." Similarly, efficiency gains from con-
solidation may result in unemployment, due to no fault of the em-
ployees.
Most countries that have competition policies apply them so as
to achieve a mix of economic efficiency and "fairness."14 The
United States, however, focuses almost exclusively on efficiency.
"In the early 1980s, as part of a plan to free business from excessive
government regulation, antitrust was re-engineered from policy
that favored open markets and entrepreneurial opportunity to law
12 Eleanor U. Fox & Robert Pitofsky, United States, in GLOBAL COMrErmON
PoLicy, supra note 8, at 235,259.
13 GRAHAM & RICHARDSON, supra note 8, at 8.
14 See, e.g., Donald Hay, United Kingdom, in GLOBAL COMPET'roN POLIcUY, su-
pra note 8, at 199, 203. The United Kingdom grants its competition authorities
wide discretion in pursuit of the public interest. According to Section 84 of the
Fair Trading Act of 1973, these authorities are to consider how the business prac-
tice at issue affects the balanced distribution of industry and employment in the
United Kingdom. Id.
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narrowly focused on output-limiting conduct that provably raises
prices to U.S. consumers." 15 These different objectives further
complicate efforts to achieve an international consensus on the
principles of competition policy.
Finally, a quick cross-country review of competition laws sug-
gests that statutory formulations of legal principles differ very little
across countries, but matter even less.16 What matters most is the
way these general statutory provisions are interpreted and applied
by administrative agencies and courts. Administrative and judicial
interpretations and enforcement of these laws differ greatly from
country to country. This similarity in law and difference in the ap-
plication of the law suggest that efforts to draft uniform interna-
tional competition rules, interpreted and applied by national poli-
cymakers, would be futile.
3. THE UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS OF COMPETITION POLICY
IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
The global economy creates numerous problems for competi-
tion policymakers and businesses today. For example, a business
contemplating a transnational merger or simply seeking to do
business in multiple markets may face inconsistent obligations as a
result of legitimate differences in policies between two or more na-
tions. In addition, many efforts on the part of producers and com-
petition policy authorities are duplicated, as several nations sepa-
rately investigate a potentially anti-competitive situation.17 But the
most pressing problems stem from national competition policy-
makers who have strong incentives to draft and apply policies with
a view to protecting or supporting domestic producers over their
foreign counterparts.
15 Fox, supra note 1, at 10. See also Daniel J. Gifford, The Draft International An-
titrust Code Proposed at Munich: Good Intentions Gone Awry, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 1, 3 (1997).
16 Indeed, many national competition statutes, such as those found in Japa-
nese and EU law, are based on the laws of the United States. Also, "[More than
seventy countries, comprising 98% of world output and 99% of world trade, have
now adopted some form of antitrust policy." Patricia 1. Hansen, Antitrust in the
Global Market: Rethinking "Reasonable Expectations," 72 S. CAL L REv. 1601, 1612
(1999).
17 For example, Gillette Company's acquisition of Wilkinson Sword had to
clear fourteen merger review offices. See OECD Committee Lacks Enthusiasm for
Draft International Antitrust Code, 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 771 (1993).
[Vol. 22:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol22/iss2/2
2001] INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY & THE GATS 291
3.1. The Most Pressing Problems: Weak Competition Laws and
Discriminatory Enforcement in the Market Access and Powerful
Exporter Contexts
National authorities often systematically favor the interests of
domestic producers (but not necessarily of domestic consumers)
over the interests of foreign producers and foreign consumers. The
result, when compared to a purely autarkic jurisdiction, is weak
competition laws and/or the discriminatory enforcement of such
laws. While discriminatory enforcement is an obvious result of
such conduct, weak competition laws are also possible. Indeed,
policymakers have little incentive to close a loophole in the law if
domestic producers as a whole benefit from the loophole.
When the interests of incumbent domestic producers are sys-
tematically favored over the interests of foreign producers, weak
laws and discriminatory enforcement will limit a foreign pro-
ducer's ability to access domestic markets. (This situation will be
referred to as the "market access context.") Examples of such al-
leged conduct abound and frequently relate to vertical restraints s
A foreign producer may lack effective legal recourse in the import
market for a variety of reasons. The competition authorities may
refuse to prosecute the case. Alternatively, the competition laws
may not provide an effective private right of action, may fail to ad-
dress this vertical restraint, or may exempt this industry from gen-
eral laws that prohibit such vertical restraints.
When the interests of domestic producers are systematically
favored over the interests of foreign consumers, weak laws and
discriminatory enforcement may enable firms in one country to
concentrate their market power, eventually allowing them to in-
crease the prices at which they export to consumers in another
country. (This situation will be referred to as the "powerful ex-
porter context") The most obvious example of such conduct is the
explicit exemption of export cartels from general competition
laws.19 The authorities in the exporting country lack the incentive
to enforce competition laws against their colluding or merging
is See Japan- Photographic Film, supra note 2; see also Aaditya Matteo & Arvind
Subramanian, Multilateral Rules on Competition Policy-A Possible Way Forward, 31
(5) J. WORLD TRADE 95, 97 (1997) (listing the distribution issues raised by U.S.
authorities in the Japanese flat glass, paper, and automobile cases).
19 For example, in the United States, the Webb-Pomerene Act creates an ex-
plicit exemption from the Sherman Act for cartels that operate exclusively in ex-
port markets. See Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C §§ 61-65 (1994).
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producers, especially if the producers sell little or no products to
the domestic consumers, or if the producers agree not to increase
prices in the domestic market. The authorities in the importing
country may be unable to enforce their competition laws against
the exporters if, for example, the exporters lack any real assets in
the importing country. While the importing country could "pun-
ish" the exporters by refusing to accept the exports altogether, this
may harm the importing country's consumers even more than the
price-fixing itself.
3.2. The Failings of Existing International Commitments
Two multilateral institutions, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development ("OECD") and the World Trade
Organization ("WTO"), address issues of international competition
more than any other. The OECD, an organization of only the most
industrialized countries, provides a useful forum for its members
to consult with one another about competition and trade policy.
While these members have adopted various "recommendations,"
including a recent initiative concerning "effective action against
hard core cartels",20 the OECD has not established any firm com-
mitments regarding the problems of weak competition laws and
discriminatory enforcement. More important, the OECD does not
have an effective procedure for the settlement of disputes between
its members. For these reasons, the OECD generally is not consid-
ered an ideal forum for addressing the problems of weak laws and
discriminatory enforcement.
On the other hand, the WTO administers numerous binding
commitments dealing with international trade relations, some of
which either explicitly or implicitly relate to competition policies.
The following briefly analyzes the (limited) extent to which the
WTO has addressed the problems of weak laws and discriminatory
enforcement in the powerful exporter and market access contexts.21
20 News Release, OECD, Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effec-
tive Action Against Hard Core Cartels, C(98)35 (Apr. 28, 1998) (adopted in Paris),
available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/clp/recommendations/rec9com.htm.
21 For a more thorough analysis, see Maria-Chiara Malaguti, Restrictive Busi-
ness Practices in International Trade and the Role of the World Trade Organization, 32
(3) J. WORLD TRADE 117, 128-31 (1998).
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3.2.1. Weak Laws and Discriminatory Enforcement in the Powerfid
Exporter Context
The WTO is not designed to deal with either weak competition
laws or even discriminatory enforcement in the powerful exporter
context. Although predatorily low prices may in some cases be
covered under Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994 ("GATT"), which "condemns" the sale of imports at
less than normal value, the high prices that result from monopoly
power apparently do not violate any provision of the GATT or the
GATS.22 Furthermore, even under the "non-violation" provisions
of Article XXIII of the GATT, a Member seeking to shield its con-
sumers from the effects of a powerful exporter would have diffi-
culty claiming that "any benefit" under the GATT is being "nulli-
fied or impaired."23 While a complaining party could claim that
the unchecked powerful exporter is impeding the "attainment of
[an] objective of the Agreement," such as, for example, "develop-
ing the full use of resources of the world and expanding the pro-
duction and exchange of goods," 24 GATT and WTO jurisprudence
suggest that a panel or the Appellate Body is unlikely to accept
such an expansive interpretation of Article XXIII of the GATT.23
3.2.2. Weak Laws in the Market Access Context
As a general matter, the WTO provides little protection against
weak national laws. The GATT generally seeks to prevent acts of
22 See U at 123.
23 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.LA.S. 1700,55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATr].
24 Id.
25 See Petros C. Mavroidis & Sally J. Van Siclen, The Applirtion of the
GATF/WTO Dispute Resolution System to Competition Issues, 31(5) J. WoRLD TRADE
5, 9-12 (1997) (arguing that the objective to achieve the "full use of the resources of
the world," contained in the Preamble of the GATT, should not form an appropri-
ate legal basis to bring competition-related disputes before the VVTO dispute set-
tlement mechanism under Article XXII0. But see Malaguti, supra note 21, at 132-
33. Malaguti argued that
a combined reading of Article D( of the GATS, Article 11 of the Safe-
guards Agreement, Article 40 of the [Uruguay Round Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights] and the 1960 Ded-
sion under the GATT [recognizing that restrictive business practices may
hamper the expansion of world trade] could provide a legal basis for a
non-violation complaint relating to any restrictive business practice....
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governmental discrimination against foreign producers, but an
across-the-board failure to enact strong competition laws is not an
obvious breach of any obligation under the GATT, even if the pur-
pose and effect of this failure is to insulate powerful domestic pro-
ducers from foreign competition.
The GATS addresses the problem of weak laws in the market
access context, albeit in a fairly limited fashion. For example, Arti-
cle VIII:1 of the GATS obligates Members to "ensure that any mo-
nopoly supplier of a service in its territory does not.., act in a
manner inconsistent with that Member's obligations under Article
II [the most-favored-nation principle] and specific commitments."26
This provision, however, only applies when there is a "sole sup-
plier of that service": 27 it does not apply if there is more than one
supplier of a service in a sector, even if competition is nevertheless
severely limited. In addition, Article VIII only applies if the Mem-
ber has affirmatively made commitments in the service sector at is-
sue and, obviously, it only applies to trade in services, not in
goods. Article IX of the GATS addresses a broad range of restric-
tive business practices across all service sectors, but it only obli-
gates Members to consult with one another "with a view to elimi-
nating" restrictive business practices: no substantive commitments
are included.
3.2.3. Discriminatory Enforcement in the Market Access Context
WTO agreements do protect against the discriminatory en-
forcement of competition laws in the market access context, but
even here the gaps in protection are wide. Take first Article III of
the GATT, which contains the "national treatment principle." Pur-
suant to Article IIh4, Members of the WTO agree to accord ex-
ported products of other Members "treatment no less favourable
than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all
laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offer-
ing for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use."28
Although some commentators have suggested that Article 111:4
protects against the discriminatory enforcement of competition
26 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the WTO, Annex 1B, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uru-
guay Round vol. 31, 33 I.LM. 142 (1994) [hereinafter GATS].
27 Id. art. XXVIII:(h).
28 GATT art. III:4 (emphasis added).
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laws,29 a complaining party claiming that another Member's dis-
cruninatory enforcement of its competition laws is violating Article
111:4 would face at least two formidable hurdles. First, it is unlikely
that a national competition authority's pattern of discriminatory
enforcement will be explicitly written in any "law" or "regulation"
or even that the pattern appears as a "requirement." Second, the
Article III analysis depends on a comparison of "like products".
As a result, a complaining party must establish that the discrimi-
natory enforcement decision treats foreign products less favorably
than like domestic products in the same sector. Because enforce-
ment decisions affect an entire product sector, the failure to enforce
competition laws by itself arguably does not necessarily treat for-
eign products less favorably, even though the decision effectively
fails to level the playing field. It does not "afford protection to the
domestic industry" in the strict sense; it only fails, intentionally
and selectively, to remove the protection that the sector has estab-
lished for itself. 30 In other words, evidence that the competition
authorities have decided not to enforce the competition laws in a
sector that is vulnerable to imports, but have enforced these laws
vigorously in other sectors, may be irrelevant to the Article III
analysis.31
According to Article X:3(a) of the GATT, "Each contracting
party shall administer in a uniform, impartial and reasonable
manner all its laws, regulations, decisions and rulings of the kind
described in paragraph 1 of this article."32 Article X:1 applies to all
"[l]aws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings
of general application... pertaining to... requirements, restric-
tions or prohibitions on imports or exports ... or affecting their
29 See, e.g., Mavroidis & Van Siden, sutpra note 25, at 8; see also Malaguti, sirpra
note 21, at 128 (arguing that Article 11I requires non-discriminatory competition
conditions).
30 See Mavroidis & Van Siden, sz'pra note 25, at 8.
31 This analysis is only intended to show the difficulties of establishing a
complaint under Article I relating to discriminatory enforcement, not to suggest
that such a complaint cannot be established. Indeed, there is support for the gen-
eral proposition that Article III broadly calls for "the effective equality of oppor-
tunities for imported products in respect of the applications of laws," W'TO Panel
Report, United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, GATT B.I.S.D. at
36S/345, para. 5.11 (Nov. 7,1989), and seeks to preserve "the conditions of competi-
tion between the domestic and imported products on the internal market." WITO
Panel Report, Italian Discrimination against Imported Agricultural Machitery, GATT
B.LS.D. at 7S/60, para. 12 (Oct. 23,1958) (emphasis added).
32 GATT art. X3(a).
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sale, distribution, [and] transportation[.]"33 Similar to the Article
III:4 analysis, it is again not clear whether an administrative deci-
sion, or even a pattern, of discriminatory enforcement constitutes
an administrative ruling of general application affecting the sale or
distribution of imports.
Based on this "near miss" of an Article III violation, a com-
plaining party could resort to the "non-violation" clause in Article
XXIII of the GATT and claim that the discriminatory enforcement
of competition laws "nullifies or impairs" benefits accruing to it
under the GATT.34 Even here, however, the complaining party
would face an uphill battle. For example, the complaining party
would have to establish that it "could not have reasonably antici-
pated" or expected that benefits accruing to it under the GATT
would be offset by the "subsequent" practice of discriminatory en-
forcement.35 Given that the discriminatory enforcement of compe-
tition policies is presumably not a new phenomenon, a complain-
ing party would have difficulty establishing its surprise.
Moreover, due in part to several important changes in law and le-
gal structure that resulted from the Uruguay Round of negotia-
tions, Frieder Roessler has suggested that "it would.., be an illu-
sion to think that panels or the Appellate Body would eagerly
embrace the idea of handing out licenses to retaliate against re-
strictive business practices without any prior normative guidance
by the membership of the WTO."36
Compared to the GATT, the GATS provides more protection
against discriminatory enforcement, albeit mostly only in service
sectors in which a Member has made specific commitments. For
example, in addition to Articles VIII and IX described above, Arti-
cle VI of the GATS requires Members to ensure that "all measures
of general application affecting trade in services are administered
in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner" in sectors where
specific commitments are undertaken.37 Because a "measure" in-
cludes a "decision" or "administrative action" by a Member,38 Ar-
ticle VI appears to prohibit the discriminatory enforcement of
33 GATT art. X:1.
34 GATT art. XXIII.
35 See Japan - Photographic Film, supra note 2, 10.76-10.77.
36 Frieder Roessler, Should Principles of Competition Policy be Incorporated into
WTO Law Through Non-Violation Complaints?, 2 J. INT'L EcON. L 413,418 (1999).
37 GATS art. VI.
38 GATS art. XXVIII(a).
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competition laws in service sectors in which specific commitments
have been undertaken. 39
In addition, through the GATS framework, Members have
adopted more detailed commitments in specific sectors. For ex-
ample, Members, pursuant to a Telecommunications Reference Pa-
per on Regulatory Principles, have agreed to maintain appropriate
measures to prevent suppliers in the telecommunications sector
from engaging in anti-competitive practices.40
In short, the GATT and GATS provide only limited protection
against discriminatory enforcement of competition laws. The
GATT provides little protection against discriminatory enforce-
ment for imported goods. Incidentally, it provides no protection
for foreign investors who manufacture goods abroad, as the GATT
only applies to trade, not investment. The GATS provides greater
protection, and even protects the foreign investor's "commercial
presence," but only for trade in services, and only for services in
which specific commitments have been undertaken.
More troubling, however, is that the WTO at present lacks the
competence and resources to address the problem of discrimina-
tory enforcement of domestic competition laws, even if such a
claim could be made under the GATT or GATS. The rule of rea-
son, for example, would require a WTO panel to pore over the
factual details of many cases before it could find discriminatory en-
forcement. At present, panels, the Appellate Body, and, generally,
the WTO as an institution lack the resources, time, and evidentiary
tools to do so.
4. INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY PROBLEMS FROM THE
PERSPECTIVE OF IR THEORY
International relations theory provides three different lenses
through which to view the problems of, and proposals to address,
weak laws and discriminatory enforcement of domestic competi-
tion policies. While IR theorists from each of these three different
schools often reach conclusions that theorists from the other
schools would not accept, for our purposes it is not necessary to
39 See also GATS arts. XVI:1 & XVII.
40 For a more complete list of WTO provisions relating to anti-competitive
practices, see Eleanor . Fox, Competition and the Millenium Round, 2 J. INT'L EcoN.
L 665,669, n.12 (1999).
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choose just one lens. Instead, the three lenses should be used to-
gether to analyze these problems and proposed solutions.
4.1. Institutionalism
"Institutionalists" are a diverse group of theorists who share a
fundamental belief that international institutions can facilitate
mutually beneficial cooperation between states. These theorists as-
sume that states are monolithic units and the primary actors in the
international system; they do not examine the role of individual
and group behavior in domestic and transnational civil society. As
the primary actors in the system, each state pursues its own self-
interest and attempts to maximize its power in an anarchic envi-
ronment 4' Institutions, or "regimes," can create a cooperative and
ordered environment in which states together can pursue overlap-
ping interests.42 "[R]egime-governed behavior must not be based
solely on short-term calculations of interest. Since regimes encom-
pass principles and norms, the utility function that is being maxi-
mized must embody some sense of general obligation." 43 Most
importantly for our purposes, "rational" institutionalists apply
economic and game theory in their examination of the cooperative
role that international institutions play. For example, international
institutions may solve a "prisoner's dilemma," by seeking to re-
duce uncertainty and various costs associated with specifying and
enforcing international agreements. 44
This analysis helps to explain state behavior in matters of trade.
Regime theorists postulate that state policymakers achieve
their biggest payoffs within a trade regime if they can de-
liver the best of both worlds to their domestic constituen-
cies: free access to foreign markets for their exporters and
protection at home for their producers and workers. If all
41 See Stephen Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as
Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL RULES: APPROACHES FROM INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 167 (Robert J. Beck et al. eds., 1996). [herein-
after INTERNATIONAL RULEs].
42 Stephen Krasner described international regimes as "principles, norms,
rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge
in a given issue area." Id.
43 Id. at 168.
44 See Robert 0. Keohane, International Institutions: Two Approadies, in
INTERNATIONAL RuLES, supra note 41, at 195.
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countries engage in absolute protection, however, all lose
the benefits of trade because export markets close, leaving
each state locked within its own domestic markeL45
International institutions, such as the WTO, attempt to achieve
a more stable, second-best solution through cooperation. If all
countries agree to open their markets, all countries will achieve
some gains from trade.
The problems of weak competition laws and discriminatory en-
forcement are functionally equivalent to protection through tariffs
and quotas. If a nation simultaneously can refuse to enact or en-
force its competition laws and can reap the benefits that accrue
from strict enforcement overseas, the nation will maximize its per-
ceived payoff. This is most obvious in the powerful exporter con-
text, where the gains to domestic producers, or "national champi-
ons," are not offset by any losses to domestic consumers. '"This
gives rise to the familiar 'prisoner's dilemma' rationale for co-
operation: each country might be better off if it employed compe-
tition policies to secure national advantage, but the pursuit of such
a strategy by all countries would render each of them worse off."46
If, however, these countries can agree to fully and indiscriminately
enact and enforce their competition policies, they will achieve a
stable, second-best solution.
4.2. Liberalism
Liberal IR theorists first look within states to explain state be-
havior. Unlike institutionalists,
[l]iberals begin with individuals and groups operating in
both domestic and transnational civil society. These are the
primary actors in the international system. State behavior
is in turn determined not by the international balance of
power, whether or not mediated by institutions, but by the
relationship between these social actors and the govern-
ments representing their interests .... State preferences are
45 G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalim and International Relations Theory: An Analy-
sis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DuKE LJ. 829, 862 (1995).
46 Mattoo & Subramanian, snpra note 18, at 103-04. See also Alan 0. Sykes,
Externalities in Open Economy Antitrust and 71eir Implications for International Com-
petition Policy, 23 HARV. J. L. & PUB. PoL'Y 89,89 (1999).
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are derivative of individual and groups preferences, but
depend crucially on which individuals and groups are rep-
resented.47
Two forms of liberalism, commercial and republican, are par-
ticularly relevant to the problems of weak competition laws and
discriminatory enforcement.
Commercial liberalism explains the individual and collec-
tive behavior of states based on the patterns of market in-
centives facing domestic and transnational economic actors.
One source of pressure for protection is domestic distribu-
tional conflict, which arises when the costs and benefits of
national policies are not internalized to the same actors,
thus encouraging rent-seeking efforts to seek personal
benefit at the expense of aggregate welfare....
The key variable in republican liberalism is the mode of
domestic political representation, which determines whose
social preferences are institutionally privileged. When po-
litical representation is biased in favor of particularistic
groups, they tend to "capture" government institutions and
employ them for their ends alone, systematically passing on
the costs and risks to others. The simplest resulting predic-
tion is that policy is biased in favor of the governing coali-
tion or powerful domestic groups .... 48
Both of these forms of liberalism explain why nations may en-
act weak competition laws or discriminatorily enforce competition
policies against foreign producers. In the market access context,
most economists would assert that it is often in a nation's best in-
terest to open market access by applying competition laws strictly
against powerful domestic producers-the gain to domestic con-
sumers typically outweighs the loss to domestic producers. Liber-
47 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Liberal International Relations Theory and International
Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 717, 727-28 (1995).
48 Andrew Moravscik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of Interna-
tional Politics, 51 INT'L ORG. 513, 528-29 (1997).
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als, however, would predict a different result Because the costs
and benefits are not internalized to the same actors (domestic con-
sumers benefit; domestic producers incur costs), commercial liber-
als would expect domestic producers to seek personal rents at the
expense of the general welfare. Republican liberals may predict
the same outcome. If the benefits of strict enforcement are spread
thinly over a large population of consumers, whereas the costs are
incurred by a smaller population of producers, one might expect
producers to voice their opposition more intensely, through cam-
paign contributions or through well-mobilized lobbying efforts.
As a result, the domestic producers would "capture" government
institutions at the expense of domestic consumers.
In the powerful exporter context, economists and liberals
would agree that strict competition laws and enforcement meas-
ures are unlikely. Economists would admit that a nation gains
(even though the world loses) because the costs of the anti-
competitive restraints are "externalized" to foreign consumers. Be-
cause no domestic constituency is harmed, liberals would expect
nations to enact and enforce weak laws in favor of powerful ex-
porters.
4.3. Realism
Like institutionalists, realists believe that states are the primary
actors in the international system. Unlike institutionalists, how-
ever, realists assert that international institutions will be ineffec-
tive, at best Because no central authority exists in the international
system, anarchy and distrust prevail and cannot be mediated by
international institutions. The dominant preference of states, there-
fore, is to attain and maintain power, as power determines the out-
comes of state interactions.49 States pursue their narrow and im-
mediate self-interests in all interactions with other states. As a
consequence, effective international law exists only to the extent
that this law reflects the interests of the most powerful states.
While neoclassical trade theory, and the game theory of the in-
stitutionalists, emphasizes the absolute gains that states can
achieve through comparative advantage, realists suggest that pow-
erful states will only engage in trade if it enhances their relative
49 Slaughter, supra note 47, at 722.
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power in the international system5 0 As a result, realists believe
that international trade regimes, such as the WTO, simply reflect
(and should only reflect) the preferences of states with the largest
markets:
For the purpose of evaluating the relative power of states to
influence the rules of international trade, power may be
seen as a function of market size. Market access has been
the primary goal of trading nations in every round of trade
negotiations since establishment of the GATT in 1947. The
sovereign powers that have most influenced the rules of
that system have been those with the largest markets.
Those powers have used access to their markets to coerce
and compensate lesser powers into accepting rules of the
system: they have compensated others with promises of
increased market access (e.g., promising tariff reductions or
elimination and quota expansion or elimination) and co-
erced others with threats of market closure (e.g., threaten-
ing unilateral action by means of section 301 of the Trade
Act of 1974, as amended).51
Because weak laws and discriminatory enforcement further
narrow self-interests and enhance economic power, realists would
expect such conduct. They also would expect that the most power-
ful states would take action, either through multilateral institutions
or unilaterally, to force weaker states into removing private re-
straints that interfere with their market access. In short, realists
would suggest that weak laws and discriminatory enforcement are
not problems at all; they simply reflect reality.
5. ExISTING PROPOSALS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF COMPETITION POUCY
Policymakers and commentators have offered a wide variety of
proposals for the international institutionalization of competition
50 See Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique
of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, 42 INT'L ORG. 485,487(1988).
51 Richard H. Steinberg, Great Power Management of the World Trading System:
A Transatlantic Strategy for Liberal Multilateralism, 29 LAw & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 205,
217 (1998).
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policy. While there are almost as many proposals as there are
commentators, four proposals provide an overview of the range of
possibilities: comprehensive supranationalism, international har-
monization through a "uniform laws" project, evolutionary mini-
mum standards, and cooperative unilateralism. The various lenses
of IR theorists help to clarify the strengths and weaknesses of these
proposals.
5.1. Comprehensive Rules and a Supranational Agency
The first approach envisions a comprehensive international
code with a supranational enforcement agency. Over the years
numerous proposals have taken this approach. Most recently, in
1993, a large group of antitrust scholars met in Munich and pre-
pared the comprehensive and supranational "Draft International
Antitrust Code" (the "DIAC").2 Although a thorough discussion
of the DIAC is beyond the scope of this paper, three aspects de-
serve close analysis and scrutiny.
5.1.1. The DIAC Protects Competitors, Not Competition
In many respects, the comprehensive substantive provisions of
the DIAC do not reflect the interests of the United States, arguably
the most powerful state in the international commercial system.
As explained above, the United States has adopted a "rule of rea-
son" approach to many aspects of competition law and is almost
exclusively concerned with efficiency and consumer welfare, not
with so-called "fairness" concerns for the welfare of other produc-
ers. By contrast, the DIAC favors per se rules and seeks to protect
competitors, not competition. For example, under the DIAC,
"[u]ndertakings may neither solicit nor inflict disadvantages upon
other undertakings," regardless of whether these "disadvantages"
benefit consumers.5 3
The DIAC's protection of competitors interferes with the ability
of U.S. firms to access foreign markets. Many of the largest multi-
national corporations are American, and international policies that
seek to protect less powerful (and less efficient) competitors will
only harm the interests of the United States.
52 Draft International Antitrust Code as a GATF-MTO-Phrilateral Trade Agree-
ment, 64 ANTrTRusr & TRADE REG. REP. S-1 (Special Supp. Aug. 19, 1993) [herein-
after DIAC].
53 Id. art. 7.
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5.1.2. The DIAC Addresses the Powerful Exporter Problem
The subject matter of the DIAC is broad. The DIAC applies "to
all restraints of competition... affecting at least two Parties" to the
DIAC.54 In other words, this proposal addresses the problems of
weak laws and discriminatory enforcement in both the market ac-
cess and the powerful exporter contexts.
If states are treated as "monolithic units," both of these contexts
should be addressed, as both suggest an aggregate harm to each
individual nation. However, if state behavior is determined by
powerful domestic interest groups, as liberals contend, it becomes
clear that states are unlikely to support the DIAC because of the
powerful exporter component Because producer interests gener-
ally dominate in matters of international trade, liberals would ex-
pect that states are more likely to accept proposals that address the
problems of weak laws and discriminatory enforcement only in the
market access context After all, producers rarely would benefit
from proposals that target conduct in the powerful exporter con-
text.
5.1.3. The DIAC's Enforcement Provisions are Inflexible
Perhaps most strikingly, the DIAC grants both private actors
and a supranational enforcement agency the power to enforce the
DIAC against both private actors and member states.55 With its re-
liance on domestic courts and its authorization of private rights of
action, the DIAC's enforcement provisions remove all flexibility
and make it impossible for members to protect their power. As a
result, the most powerful nations, especially the United States, op-
pose this approach.56
54 Id. art. 3, sec. 1. "A Party to the [DIAC] is affected whenever there are eco-
nomic effects in its territory or otherwise on its commerce, or private persons na-
tionals of this Party, or undertakings having their main commercial establishment
on the territory of the Party, are initiators or victims of a restraint of competition."
Id.
5 Id. arts. 17-20.
56 For a discussion of the relationship between international relations theory
and inflexible international trade dispute resolution systems, see Shell, supra note
41.
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5.2. Harmonization
The second approach seeks not to draft international competi-
tion rules that would be enforced ultimately by a supranational
authority but to harmonize national competition laws. There are
several proposed methods for achieving harmonization, including
"roots-up," where informal information exchange eventually leads
nations to approach anti-competitive behavior in a similar fash-
ion.57 For the purposes of this analysis, however, it is best to focus
on the use of a "uniform laws" project. Nations would agree to ac-
cept the provisions of the uniform law, but would retain enforce-
ment power and would not be subject to international or suprana-
tional oversight
Unlike the DIAC, harmonization recognizes that, especially in
the short term, nations are unwilling to relinquish enforcement
power. This recognition reflects some of the concerns of both real-
ists and liberals. From the realist perspective, decision-making
authority ultimately remains in the hands of national authorities.
These authorities could interpret the code in a way that furthers
the national interest, without regard for the competing interests of
others. Realists, especially in most powerful nations, would favor
this flexibility over the constraints of a supranational code. From
the liberal perspective, harmonization recognizes the entrenched
interests of national judges and bureaucrats in enforcement agen-
cies. Any change in international competition policy would be ex-
tremely difficult to achieve without the support of these judges and
bureaucrats. Harmonization reaffirms the role of these officers.
Nevertheless, the virtues of harmonization reflect three even
greater vices. First, national differences are likely to persist even
after the superficial harmonization of laws occurs. This outcome is
particularly likely in the area of antitrust because a uniform inter-
national antitrust code is unlikely to contain precise rules that can
be easily applied and do not depend on a detailed factual analysis
in a given case.
57 See Robert Pitofsky, Competition Policy in a Global Econony - Tolay and
Tomorrow, 2 J. INT'L Ecom. L 403, 410-11 (1999) (stating that "there is a kind of in-
formal convergence by 'learning.' As scholars, practitioners and enforcement offi-
cials meet more frequently, explain the unique qualities of their system, and de-
bate the merits of each, there is a slow, subtle but discernible trend toward more
uniform approaches.'). The problem with this form of convergence, however, is
that it is too slow to achieve the necessary results in a rapidly changing and
growing global economy. See Fox, stipra note 1, at 16-1Z
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[D]isparate antitrust treatment . .. normally results not
from different formulations of the principles but from the
different meanings given to specific key words-particu-
larly "anticompetitive" and "abuse"-and different meth-
odologies for defining markets and assessing market
power. These differences in treatment are not apparent in
the literal words of the antitrust rules; the rules could have
exactly the same wording and the differences would per-
sist. The persistent differences tend to be based on matters
of principle; e.g., whether abuse law should be used to
remedy unfair exploitations and exclusions, or only to im-
prove market efficiency.5 S
Thus, the tension between international trade and competition
policy is likely to persist even after the superficial harmonization of
laws.
As Spencer Weber Waller has argued, uniform laws will fail to
achieve their purpose unless they reflect common underlying prin-
ciples and values.
The tensions between the United States and Japan are an
excellent illustration of the problems and assumptions un-
derlying recent attempts at harmonizing competition law.
Much of the frustration in the United States stems from the
assumption-at least implicit-that competition law in Ja-
pan should work in a similar fashion as in the United States
given the textual similarities between the two sets of legal
rules and the role of the United States in the promulgation
of the Japanese Antimonopoly Act at the end of World War
II. Instead, Japan, without an indigenous tradition of com-
petition as a value to enforce through legal mechanisms,
began amending its antitrust laws as soon as politically
possible.... Japan thus was successful in shaping its anti-
monopoly law to meet indigenous societal needs, but may
have eliminated the core of a competition law system in
doing so. In reality, the United States and Japan are not
58 Fox, supra note 1, at 16.
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even discussing the same topic when they discuss competi-
tion policy3 9
Thus, to achieve true harmonization, each state must reshape its
underlying values, and all states together must construct common
principles.60 Many proponents of harmonization fail to appreciate
that this is a slow process that can only be achieved through an on-
going dialogue between nations.
Second, harmonization does not directly address the problem
of national competition authorities systematically favoring domes-
tic interests over foreign interests and does not offer a solution to
the discriminatory enforcement of competition laws. It "jumps
ahead" to resolve more subtle problems that result from more le-
gitimate national differences.
Finally, the subject matter of harmonization is even broader
than that of the DIAC. Harmonization targets the problems of
weak laws and discriminatory enforcement in the market access
context, the powerful exporter context, and even conduct that has
no effect on international trade. It implies the modification of ex-
isting national laws, even in cases in which no foreign producer,
consumer, or government has any interest Because pre-existing
national laws may reflect unique cultural concerns, even if true
harmonization of law can occur, it will unnecessarily constrain a
nation's antitrust preferences. Thus, harmonization may result in
even more resistance from domestic interest groups than does the
DIAC.
5.3. Evolution from Bilateral Conity to Plurilateral Minimum
Standards
As envisioned by the European Commission in the 1995 "Van
Miert Report" and by Eleanor Fox, the third approach would com-
bine informal bilateral and plurilateral cooperative efforts from
"below" with "top down," international minimum standards.
59 Spencer Weber Wailer, Neo-Realism and the Intenational Harmonization of
Law: Lessons from Antitrust, 42 U. KAN. L REv. 557,573-74 (1994).
60 See John Gerard Ruggie, Mat Makes the World Hang Together? Mo-
Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge, 52 INTL ORG. 855, 868 (1998)
("The most important feature differentiating [constructivists] ... is that they make
the case that principled beliefs are not simply 'theoretical fillers,' ... employed to
shore up instrumentalist accounts, but that in certain circumstances they lead
states to redefine their interests or even their sense of self.").
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Substantive principles would be few and of major market im-
portance, e.g., an anticartel rule and a market access rule. Nations
would agree to adopt the consensus principles into their national
law, using any nonparochial formulation of their choice. They
would agree to apply the rules for the benefit of harmed persons or
entities anywhere within the territory of the contracting nations;
and to enforce the rules, particularly when foreign trade or invest-
ment is concerned.61
In the first instance, national courts would apply the minimum
standards, but an international body, perhaps the WTO, would
have the jurisdiction to determine whether patterns of failure to en-
force competition law exist in cases affecting the trade and invest-
ment of other WTO members.62 As the system develops, interna-
tional standards and principles would increasingly replace ad hoc
positive comity.
Under the framework, Fox suggests the WTO would have a ro-
bust set of available remedies. "Remedies might include manda-
tory injunctions to implement the common principles, enforce the
law, or open markets; and they might include fines, and compen-
satory damages, rather than trade remedies such as retaliation,
which tend to heighten barriers and may lead to managed trade."63
This proposal has many advantages. With its reliance on an
international dispute settlement body, it effectively addresses dis-
criminatory enforcement. Indeed, the types of remedies Fox con-
templates would ensure that even a small, powerless nation could
prevent a large, powerful nation from cheating on the agreement.
More importantly, this "bottom up, top down" approach recog-
nizes that common principles must precede truly harmonized
laws; it allows the international community to discuss and develop
the more controversial international standards over time.
Despite its improvements over the DIAC and "uniform laws"
harmonization, however, this approach is unlikely to succeed in
the immediate future for at least two reasons. First, especially with
remedies such as injunctions and fines, the United States is un-
likely to bind itself to these minimum standards, as explained in
the discussion of the DIAC above. With its extraterritorial appli-
cation of national antitrust laws, and its use of Section 301 of the
61 See Fox, supra note 1, at 19.
62 See ICPAC REPORT, supra note 3, at 266.
63 Fox, supra note 1, at 24.
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Trade Act of 1974, the United States generally has the market
power and legal tools to pressure others to treat the United States
"fairly." As a result, it has little to gain, and something to lose, by
accepting international minimum standards. While the U.S. one
day may perceive its interests in such a way that the loss of flexi-
bility in this area is no longer a significant concern, today it ap-
pears unwilling to forfeit its power to determine unilaterally which
nations are restricting market access.
Second, like the DIAC, this approach addresses competition
policy problems in both the market access and the powerful ex-
porter contexts. Even though it applies only "minimum stan-
dards" initially, politically and commercially powerful producers
are more likely to oppose the inclusion of anticartel rules and other
measures in the powerful exporter context.
5.4. "Cooperative Unilateralism"
Largely reflecting the status quo, the final approach primarily
encourages bilateral agency cooperation and, if cooperation is not
forthcoming, the enforcement of existing national laws (including
the extraterritorial application of these laws and "self help"). 64 The
U.S. Department of Justice, under the direction of Joel Klein, for-
mer Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, supports this ap-
proach. A majority of the members of the International Competi-
tion Policy Advisory Committee to the Attorney General recently
recommended a continuation of this policy as well.65
Fox has criticized the dependence on national laws approach,
concluding that it "overstates the extent to which national law and
agency cooperation can... solve antitrust problems.... [A]gency
cooperation is fruitful only when nations perceive their interests to
be common and choose to cooperate." 66 From a realist's perspec-
tive, of course, this is exactly the point The flexibility of ad hoc
agency cooperation, when supported by "self-help" mechanisms
such as Section 301 and the extraterritorial application of U.S. anti-
trust law, clearly reflects the immediate interests of the United
States. By contrast, inflexible, long-term commitments that fail to
64 See id at 17-18.
65 ICPAC REPORr, supra note 3, at 265-277; see also Joel Klein, Editorial, No
Monopoly on Antitrust, FiN. TiMEs (London), Feb. 13,1998, at 20.
66 Fox, supra note 1, at 18; see also ICPAC REPoRT, sipra note 3, annex 1-A
(providing the separate statement of Advisory Committee member Eleanor M.
Fox).
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reflect the power and interests of states will be ineffective or even
harmful to the international system.
While cooperative unilateralism respects the power and narrow
self-interests of states, its proponents also explain why otherwise
effective international institutions, such as the WTO, would be un-
able to deal with the complexities of competition policy. Accord-
ing to Joel Klein, WTO oversight of governmental enforcement ac-
tions would "involve the WTO in second-guessing prosecutorial
decision making in complex evidentiary contexts -a task in which
the WTO has no experience and for which it is not suited .... " 67 In
other words, proponents of cooperative unilateralism argue that
WTO decision-makers cannot distinguish "cheating" from legiti-
mate and unbiased national enforcement decisions. Since interna-
tional institutions cannot easily monitor compliance with the norm
of national treatment, they are ill-equipped to solve any "prisoner's
dilemma."
There are at least three important flaws to the arguments of co-
operative unilateralists. First, cooperative unilateralism fails to
imagine how the WTO could be modified so as to gain the experi-
ence and tools to tackle the economic and legal complexities of an-
titrust. Second, this approach fails to recognize that even powerful
states can benefit from international institutions. For example, the
United States' efforts to convince Japan to apply its competition
laws more strictly have been ineffective in many respects. Because
international institutions are better able to tie behavior to reputa-
tion (the "shadow of the future") and to link disparate issues to-
gether, they can be a more effective force for change, even if sanc-
tions are not authorized.
Finally, like harmonization, cooperative unilateralism seeks to
impose uniformity before legitimate differences in values have
been resolved. The extraterritoriality of American antitrust law
and the use of Section 301 often only exacerbate international ten-
sions. By contrast, a more constructive approach, in which states
would slowly develop common underlying principles, would
ameliorate international tensions.
67 Assistant Attorney General Joel Klein, A Reality Check on Antitrust Rules
in the World Trade Organization, And a Practical Way Forward on International
Antitrust, Address Before the OECD Conference on Trade and Competition (June
30, 1999) (transcript available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/clp/trade_
competition/conference/kleinsp.htm).
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In summary, IR theory helps to explain the shortcomings of
these proposals. Another explanation applies equally to all of
these proposals: none considers how domestic interest groups
within a country could be mobilized to achieve reform. With re-
spect to the market access context, it is assumed that the state fa-
vors domestic producer interests, even at the expense of domestic con-
sumer interests (and foreign producer interests, of course).
Although the above proposals assume that only the international
community of monolithic states can resolve the problem of weak
laws and discriminatory enforcement in the market access context,
strengthening the voice of domestic consumers could help.
6. AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL: A DISTRIBUTION SERVICES
REFERENCE PAPER TO THE GATS
Drawing on concepts from IR and economic theory, the fol-
lowing modest initiative targets anti-competitive behavior solely in
the distribution sector (i.e., most vertical restraints). This initiative
would take the form of a distribution services "Reference Paper" as
an annex to WTO Members' Schedule of Specific Commitments
under the GATS.
Although vertical restraints in the distribution services sector
are not the only restraints that limit market access, these restraints
play a crucial role in most international disputes at the intersection
of trade and competition policy.6s Because the marketing of almost
every good involves "distribution services" of some kind, this ini-
tiative would begin to bridge the gap between the present, limited
sectoral approach to competition policy in the WTO (e.g., tele-
communications and intellectual property) and universal, cross-
sectoral WTO coverage. Only after the WTO develops its compe-
tence to deal with vertical restraints should it consider addressing
a wider range of private restraints to market access.
63 Private or quasi-private restraints in the distribution services sector are at
the core of almost every trade/competition policy dispute between the United
States and Japan. The U.S. has criticized Japan's distribution nehtworks in the
automotive, flat glass, paper, photographic film, electronic equipment, and soda
ash industries. See ICPAC REPoRT, supra note 3, at 211-16. These services are also
at the heart of trade/competition disputes involving Latin America, other coun-
tries in Asia, and in Europa See id. at 216-20.
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6.1. The Framework of the Proposal
Like the Telecommunications Reference Paper on Pro-
Competitive Regulatory Principles, this Distribution Services Paper
would serve as a clarification and modification of existing compe-
tition policy commitments under the GATS. The central modifica-
tion would relate to Article IX of GATS:
1. Members recognize that certain business practices of
service suppliers... may restrain competition and thereby
restrict trade in services.
2. Each Member shall, at the request of any other Member,
enter into consultations with a view to eliminating practices
referred to in paragraph 1. The Member addressed shall
accord full and sympathetic consideration to such a request
and shall cooperate through the supply of publicly avail-
able non-confidential information of relevance to the matter
in question. The Member addressed shall also provide
other information available to the requesting Member,
subject to its domestic law and to the conclusion of satis-
factory agreement concerning the safeguarding of its confi-
dentiality by the requesting Member.69
In essence, the Paper would seek to enhance the effectiveness
of the consultation procedure referred to in Article IX (2) by in-
cluding an impartial panel of experts to hear disputes. A Member
would be entitled to request consultations and a panel if the anti-
competitive business practices harm either that Member's distri-
bution service suppliers or, even, that Member's goods manufac-
turers, who rely on another Member's distribution services suppli-
ers.
The Paper would obligate Members, who have failed to resolve
the dispute through initial consultations, to submit the dispute to a
non-binding panel of antitrust experts. The panel, selected ad hoc by
the parties to the dispute and sitting in the country of the re-
sponding Member, would be charged with determining whether
69 GATS art. IXl-2.
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an action (or inaction) taken by the competition authorities of the
responding Member (1) resulted in inefficiencies that harmed con-
sumers through higher prices (or reduced output or quality) and
(2) tended to significantly distort trade in the market access con-
text. The panel would consist of at least three members and its af-
firmative decisions would need to be unanimous. The complain-
ing Member would bear the burden of proving, with "dear and
convincing evidence", that the authority's behavior harms con-
sumers and limits market access.
This initiative uses both the international community of states
and non-governmental interest groups to persuade a state to
strengthen its competition laws and enforcement measures. An af-
firmative panel finding should mobilize interest groups, including
domestic consumers and foreign producers, to push for competi-
tion policy reform "from within." After all, an impartial and
unanimous finding that a nation's enforcement authorities are
dearly failing to act in the best interests of domestic consumers is
likely to focus attention on a nation's competition policy. In the
international community of states an affirmative panel finding
would facilitate discussions of the issue among member states,
while maintaining flexibility and respecting sovereignty.
The following is an explanation of the major elements of this
proposal:
(1) Panel Selection:
The parties to the dispute select the members of the panel for
two important reasons. First, an ad hoc selection mechanism allows
the parties to tailor the panel to the specific issue in dispute. Ex-
perts in resale price maintenance may lack expertise in vertical
mergers, for example. Because competition policy is complex and
dependent on a high level of economic analysis and fact-finding,
this "customization" may be more important than it is in tradi-
tional trade disputes. Second, because the losing party participates
in the selection of the panel and because the panel will have par-
ticular expertise in the precise issue before it, panel findings will be
more persuasive and legitimate.
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(2) The Location of the Panel Proceedings and Public Pronounce-
ments:
Local proceedings facilitate the mobilization of domestic politi-
cal support for competition policy reform. One would expect that
the local press is more likely to cover the investigation and out-
come of the panel if the panel proceedings take place at home. In
addition, local proceedings may facilitate the discovery of infor-
mation used in the proceeding.
In addition, Members should consider other ancillary commit-
ments designed to inform the responding Member's general pub-
lic. For instance, the Members could agree on the general form of a
press release from the WTO panel. Wherever possible, the press
release could contain a panel estimate of the cost consumers incur
as a result of the existing competition policy or practice. The WTO
would then distribute the press release, especially to the major me-
dia groups in the country of the responding Member. In addition,
non-governmental organizations, including the foreign producers
that were injured by the discriminatory policies and possibly do-
mestic consumer rights organizations, would disseminate the
finding of the panel to the general public.
(3) Scope of the Subject Matter:
A panel would be authorized to hear any dispute that concerns
the competitive nature of the distribution services sector (i.e., any
alleged vertical restraints that occur after the manufacture of an
end product, as well as horizontal restraints and anti-competitive
mergers between distributors).70
Limiting a competition policy initiative to the distribution
services sector will allow the WTO to begin to experiment with,
and to grow accustomed to, matters of competition policy beyond
those involving telecommunications and other narrowly focused
sectors. The application of wide-ranging standards and "hard" en-
forcement measures, by contrast, could overwhelm a fledgling
competition authority.
70 Although this includes most cases of vertical restraints, vertical restraints
that occur, for example, between raw material providers and manufacturers
would not be included.
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Disputes could concern individual determinations or, more
likely, a pattern or practice of behavior on the part of the competi-
tion authorities. Although previous proposals reflect a reluctance
to examine individual determinations at the international level, a
panel, like a national court, would have little difficulty with such
an examination. In any event, it is impossible to avoid an exami-
nation of individual cases, even in reviews of general patterns or
practices. Joel Klein does not know:
what it means to say ... that individual cases will not be
reviewed but that a "pattern" may be; a pattern is a series
of individual cases, and even if the whole were greater than
the sum of its parts, any meaningful dispute resolution
powers in this field could not ignore the parts.7
(4) The Standards: Detrimental Effect on Domestic Consumers
and Significant Market Access Limitation:
Central to this proposal are the two broad questions that the
panel must answer: (1) does the Member's action, or failure to act,
have a detrimental effect on domestic consumer welfare and (2)
does it significantly limit market access for foreign producers?
The first prong of the test is important for at least two funda-
mental reasons. First, it addresses the efficiency objective that all
national competition policies should pursue. If a vertical restraint
increases consumer prices, reduces output or reduces a product's
quality, it is inefficient and harmful to consumers. By phrasing the
question in general and conclusory terms, per se rules that are easy
to apply (but harmful to the market) are avoided. In other words,
this question grants a panel substantial discretion to apply a "rule
71 Klein, supra note 61. See also Mark A. A. Warner, Competition Policy ind
GATS, in GATS 2000. NEW DiRECriONs iN SERvicEs TRADE LBERAUIZATION 371 (Pi-
erre Sauv6 & Robert M. Stem eds., 2000).
Although there appears to be a consensus that dispute settlement should
not apply to individual cases because of the complex and fact-intensive
nature of competition law and policy, it is worth noting that the WTO al-
ready deals with complex and fact-intensive cases under the Agreement
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SFS Agree-
ment) or involving environmental measures.
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of reason" and to consider the specific merits of each individual
case.
Second, the "consumer" prong reflects the underlying purpose
of the initiative. Rather than using a binding enforcement mecha-
nism to compel a Member to change its policy, a non-binding panel
finding seeks to mobilize domestic and international political sup-
port for reform. When an impartial panel publicly finds that a
Member's authorities are adopting policies that harm its consum-
ers, those consumers become better informed and more likely to
mobilize for change. This attempt to inform and change domestic
public opinion responds to the rising tide of critics who claim that
the WTO usurps decision-making authority from democratically
elected national and sub-national officials. Instead of "stripping
countries of their sovereign rights," this approach attempts to in-
form the local democratic process. In other words, this approach
simply seeks to inform domestic consumers in order for them to
determine whether they are willing to accept inefficiencies and
higher prices in exchange for competitive "fairness," for example,
in the form of protection for small- and medium-sized enterprises.
The "market access" prong ensures that competition policy
provisions adapted to the needs of the distribution services sector
are consistent with the basic purpose of the WTO. Moreover, be-
cause this prong ensures that international involvement in compe-
tition policy will be limited to cases in which foreign producers
have an interest, this initiative is likely to be more popular with
WTO Members. The requirement that any market access limitation
be "significant" (i.e., not de minimis) also respects the authority of
the Member's competition policymakers; competition policies and
decisions that are only incidentally related to international trade
will remain within the exclusive purview of the national authori-
ties.
(5) Panel Unanimity and "Clear Evidence":
Because the effectiveness of any affirmative panel finding de-
pends in part on public perception, the finding should be strong
and clear. A unanimous conclusion that a policy or practice clearly
harms consumers and limits market access achieves this goal. In
addition, it may be easier for the Members to accept WTO in-
volvement in competition policy if panel findings are subject to
unanimity and a high burden of proof.
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(6) Non-Binding Findings:
The general purpose of this approach is to mobilize domestic
and international political support for reform, instead of creating
an inflexible obligation to bring national laws into conformity with
WTO commitments. As a result, findings should have no direct le-
gal consequence. Of course, the non-binding nature of the panel
decisions necessarily implies that these decisions will be less effec-
tive than they would be under the traditional WTO approach, in
which a party may be authorized by the Dispute Settlement Body
to suspend the application of concessions.7 Nevertheless, domes-
tic and international political pressure will be mobilized in the
worst cases, where national policies clearly harm consumers and
limit market access.
While this "soft approach" may appear inconsistent with ex-
isting dispute mechanisms of the largely successful WTO, it is im-
portant to remember that it took almost fifty years for the GATT to
accept binding enforcement through the "negative consensus"
rule. A similar evolution is necessary with respect to competition
policy.
(7) Why a Multilateral Solution? Why the WTO?
A multilateral approach, especially within the WTO frame-
work, is most likely to succeed for several reasons. First, the WTO
already addresses a number of competition policy issues, as men-
tioned in Section 3 above. Second, when the Members begin to de-
velop the principles contained in the Reference Paper, these princi-
ples could be incorporated more directly in the general WTO
dispute settlement framework, with its binding force and authori-
zation of retaliatory countermeasures73
72 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15,1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Or-
ganization, arts. 22(2), 23(6), LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.LM. 112 [hereinafter Understanding on Settlement of
Disputes].
73 The WTO is a more appropriate forum than the OECD.
[A]lthough the OECD contributes significantly to advancing the interna-
tional competition policy debate, institutional limitations constrain its
ability to play a more expansive role in developing a global approach to
trade and competition interface issues. For one thing, the organization is
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Third, placing this proposal within the broad WTO framework
increases the likelihood that nations will accept it. Many Members
that would otherwise oppose the Reference Paper will be willing to
accept the initiative in exchange for other concessions, such as
further tariff reductions on their exports. Because different Mem-
bers will have different preferences, adding competition policy to
other issues within the WTO allows Members to "trade on these
differences" and increase the value of their negotiated solution.74
Finally, a multilateral approach is likely to improve the likeli-
hood of competition policy reform. As explained in more detail
below, a state will want to maintain its reputation in the interna-
tional community, and "third-party" states are likely to persuade
the state to comply with the principles of national treatment and
open market access.
6.2. The Reference Paper, as Viewed from IR Theory
The Reference Paper rests on the assumption that domestic po-
litical pressure from consumers and pressure from the interna-
tional community of nations is sufficient to achieve competition
policy reform where reform is needed most This mechanism will
only be effective in the most egregious cases, but that is exactly
where to begin. The more subtle disputes can be addressed after
the international community has achieved a consensus on the prin-
ciples of competition policies.
As viewed through the various lenses of IR theory, the Refer-
ence Paper is a sensible first step in dealing with the international
tension between trade and competition policy for the following
reasons.
6.2.1. The Reference Paper has a Limited Subject Matter
The Reference Paper only addresses the problems of weak laws
and discriminatory enforcement in the market access context, not
in the powerful exporter context. This limitation recognizes that
producer interests often determine a state's preferences in matters
of international trade. Producers have little reason to support ef-
perceived by nonmember nations as a forum for more developed coun-
tries.
ICPAC REPORT, supra note 4, at 258.
74 See MAX H. BAZERMAN & MARGARET A. NEALE, NEGOTIATING RATIONALLY 98
(1992).
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forts to rein in powerful exporters. If these powerful exporters are
charging excessively high prices, that only benefits other produc-
ers. If these exporters are pricing "predatorily" (Le., excessively
low prices to drive out foreign competitors), existing anti-dumping
laws usually provide a remedy. By contrast, producers do have
some reason to support efforts to resolve the problems of weak
laws and discriminatory enforcement in the market access context
These efforts will benefit foreign producers, as well as domestic
consumers.
6.2.2. The Reference Paper Recognizes the Need for Flexibility and
the Interests of Powerful States
Especially in the immediate future, the United States is un-
willing to relinquish its enforcement powers in exchange for un-
tested and rigid supranational rules. The Reference Paper recog-
nizes that the most powerful states, including the United States
and the European Union, are more likely to favor a more diplo-
matic approach over binding enforcement rules. In addition, be-
cause the panel of experts will make determinations solely on the
basis of efficiency concerns, not culturally nuanced fairness con-
cerns, the determinations will be consistent with existing U.S. anti-
trust policy and U.S. interests. Nations that base competition poli-
cies on vague fairness concerns will be able to continue to do so,
but will be compelled to explain the basis of these concerns to the
international community and to domestic consumers.
6.2.3. The Reference Paper Addresses Conipetition Laws, As Applied
At least until the international community develops a consen-
sus on the basic principles and purposes of competition policies,
uniform laws will be interpreted differently in different states. As
a result, efforts to harmonize legal standards serve little purpose.
The Reference Paper avoids formalistic legal standards in favor of
an ad hoc economic analysis of domestic competition laws, as ap-
plied.
By focusing on the application of the law, the Reference Paper
recognizes that international institutions have a comparative ad-
vantage over individual nations in monitoring the behavior of
other nations-especially when the legal and economic complexi-
ties of competition policy can be used to mask discriminatory
treatment of foreign interests. In many areas of trade, detection of
non-compliance is a fairly straightforward matter. After all, an ex-
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porter immediately recognizes when a Member imposes excessive
tariffs and quotas. The discriminatory enforcement of competition
policies, however, is much more difficult to detect. As explained in
Section 2 above, the "rule of reason" makes it difficult to deter-
mine whether national competition authorities treated foreign
competitors fairly in a given case. In addition, when an agency de-
cides that it is not necessary to prosecute a given case, this decision
may be unpublished, making detection of discrimination almost
impossible. An impartial panel will have greater access to infor-
mation and will be better able to determine whether discrimination
occurred. As a result, the panel's determination is more likely to
be treated as an objective assessment of these facts.
6.2.4. The Reference Paper Provides a Forum for Developing an
International Consensus on the Principles and Purposes of
Competition Policies
Over time the panel process will lead states to reconsider and
reshape their interests in favor of the socially constructed frames of
consumer welfare, market access, and national treatment.75 Before,
during and after a panel investigation, a target Member may ex-
plain how its conduct is consistent with these principles. Alterna-
tively, the Member may argue that there is an interest that over-
rides these principles in an "exceptional case." For example, the
Member may assert that its present policy is based on some cultur-
ally nuanced principle of "fairness" that rises above efficiency con-
cerns.
The point is that, as a result of an affirmative panel finding, and
the concomitant pressure from the international community,
Members must attempt "to gain assent to value judgments on rea-
soned rather than idiosyncratic grounds."76 Through this process,
75 See Ruggie, supra note 60.
76 ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 119 (1995).
In the conditions we have called the new sovereignty, there are too many
audiences, foreign and domestic, too many relationships present and
potential, too many linkages to other issues to be ignored. When a state's
conduct is challenged as inconsistent with a legal norm or otherwise
questionable, the state, almost of necessity, must respond-it must try to
show that the facts are not as they seem to be; or that the rule, properly
interpreted, does not cover the conduct in question; or that some other
matter excuses non-performance.
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the target Member's interests are reconstructed "in terms of shared
commitments to social norms."77
This discussion is a prerequisite for the deep harmonization of
international competition policies. While such a discussion may be
useful in many areas of international commercial policy, the eco-
nomic complexities and culturally nuanced fairness objectives of
competition policy today necessitate an on-going discussion in this
field. Without the collective development of some of the core prin-
ciples of competition policy (e.g., the existence and meaning of
"abuse" of market position), nations will continue to apply even
identical laws very differently.
6.2.5. The Reference Paper Increases the Likelihood of Reform
The Reference Paper will reduce the problems of weak laws
and discriminatory enforcement, even without binding decisions.
The panel process will serve as an ongoing forum for members to
persuade respondents to reform their competition policies. There
are, of course, many different persuasive techniques: a Member
may appeal to reason and existing international norms, may
threaten retaliation, or, perhaps most importantly, may remind the
respondent of the importance of maintaining its present standing
in the international community of nations, in which a broad range
of issues are linked.
A good deal of the compliance pull of international rules
derives from the relationship between individual rules and
the broader pattern of international relations: states follow
specific rules, even when inconvenient, because they have a
longer-term interest in the maintenance of law-impregnated
international community. It is within this broader context
that ideas about reputation are most powerful and most
critical. This can, to a certain extent, be captured by ideas
of "lengthening the shadow of the future," by broadening
notions of self-interest and reciprocity... 78
Id.
77 Id at 123.
78 Andrew Hurrell, Intentational Society md the Study of Reginies: A Reflective
Approach, in INTERNATIONAL RULeS, supra note 41, at 213.
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When an impartial panel of experts unanimously determines
that a measure harms domestic consumers and limits market .ac-
cess, failure to reform is likely to harm a Member's reputation both
within the WTO and more generally within the international com-
munity.
6.2.6. The Reference Paper Mobilizes Domestic Interest Groups
The Reference Paper differs significantly from previous pro-
posals in that it seeks the participation of domestic interest groups,
especially consumers, in the reform process. It recognizes that
domestic consumers have a stake and can play an important role in
international trade disputes involving competition policies.
By making the principle of consumer welfare explicit and cen-
tral to the panel's determination, affirmative panel findings will
better inform consumers and lead to pressure "from within" the
member state for competition policy reform. Indeed, because pan-
elists will explicate and estimate the harm to consumers, in mone-
tary terms if possible, consumers are more likely to demand
change. No longer will national governments be able to hide be-
hind the intricacies of competition policies and claim that their ac-
tions promote consumer welfare; an impartial body of experts,
chosen by the national government itself, will establish otherwise.
This attempt to mobilize consumers replaces the need to obtain
binding international enforcement mechanisms.
Supranational institutions may not always be able to prom-
ulgate and enforce law, but they can and do frequently
generate norms [and applications of norms to particular
circumstances] that are disseminated by nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) to pressure domestic political actors.
Many of these NGOs are... skilled in the ways of using
law to promote social change, however slowly and imper-
fectly.79
While consumer interest groups generally are not known for
their power in domestic politics, they occasionally do mobilize for
79 Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., International Law and International Relations
Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INr'L L 367, 371
(1998).
[Vol. 22:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol22/iss2/2
2001] INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY & THE GATS 323
political action. In fact, European consumer groups recently
"waged war" on the car industry's special distribution rules and
were given credit for forcing the EU competition commissioner to
reconsider an exemption that allowed car manufacturers to estab-
lish exclusive distributorships.8 0 The power of these groups is
likely to grow if an international and impartial panel of experts can
provide valuable information about the costs of cozy deals be-
tween domestic producers and national governments.
7. CONCLUSION
Most observers and policymakers would agree that nations
should have and enforce laws prohibiting commercial conduct that
"unreasonably" impairs market access and should enforce their
laws without discrimination as to nationality.81 The disagreement
revolves around what exactly these basic principles would require
in practice. For example, what constitutes an "unreasonable im-
pairment" to market access and how should the decision-maker
treat a nation's culturally nuanced "fairness" considerations? Who
should determine whether a nation has applied these principles,
and what should happen when a nation fails to do so?
A non-binding dispute resolution procedure that attempts to
inform domestic consumers and the international community of
the economic costs that result from the failure to address vertical
restraints to market access would be a first step in answering these
questions. In the short term, domestic consumers and the interna-
tional community may persuade nations that fail to address such
commercial conduct to reconsider their policies in the most egre-
gious cases. In the long term, this procedure and the discourse that
it creates will help to develop an international consensus on the
principles and objectives of competition policies.
This proposal represents a compromise between the pure
power politics behind unilateral action, on the one hand, and an in-
flexible system of international, legalistic rules, on the other. By in-
forming domestic interest groups and by facilitating international
discourse, it seeks to reduce existing tensions and to take a modest
step toward a more comprehensive approach to international com-
petition policy.
SO See Monti Attacks Carmakers on Restrictive Sales, FiN. Tu.iES (London), May
12,2000, at 8.
81 See Fox, supra note 40, at 672.
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